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1 In rank-dependent approaches, the weights attached to outcomes are differences in
weighted cumulative probabilities.  For example, if the outcomes are ordered x1   > x2   > ... > x n ,
the weight on outcome  x i is À (p1 + p2 +... pi)- À(p1 + p2 +....pi-1). (Notice that if À (p)=p this
weight is just the probability pi.).  In cumulative prospect theory gains and losses are ranked and
weighted separately (by magnitude).
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Prospect theory in the wild: 
Evidence from the field
Colin Camerer*
The workhorses of economic analysis are simple formal models which can explain
naturally-occurring phenomena.  Reflecting this taste, economists often say they will incorporate
more psychological ideas into economics if those ideas can parsimoniously account for field data
better than standard theories do. Taking this statement seriously, this paper describes ten
regularities in naturally-occurring data which are anomalies for expected utility theory, but can all
be explained by three simple elements of prospect theory-- loss-aversion, reflect ion effects, and
nonlinear weighting of probability-- along with the assumption that people isolate decisions (or
edit them) from others they might be grouped with (Read, Loewenstein,  and Rabin, 1998; cf.
Thaler, this volume). I hope to show how much success has already been had applying prospect
theory to field data, and to inspire economists and psychologists to spend more time in the wild.
The 10 patterns are summarized in Table 1.  To keep the paper brief, I sketch expected
utility and prospect theory very quickly. (Readers who want to know more should look elsewhere
in this volume or in Camerer, 1995, or Rabin, 1998a).  In expected utility, gambles which yield
risky outcomes xi with probabilities pi are valued according to " piu(xi) where u(x) is
the  utility   of outcome x.  In prospect theory they are valued by " À (pi)v(xi-r), where À (p) is a
function which weights probabilities nonlinearly, overweight ing probabilities below .3 or so and
underweighting larger probabilities.1 The value function v(x-r) exhibits diminishing marginal
sensitivity to deviations from the reference point r, creating a   reflection effect   because v(x-r) is
convex for losses and concave for gains (i.e., v  (x-r)>0 for x<r and v  (x-r)<0 for x>r).  The value
function also exhibits  loss-aversion -- the value of a loss -x is larger in magnitude than the value
of an equal-sized gain (i.e., -v(-x)>v(x) for x>0). 
1. Finance: The equity premium
Two important anomalies in finance can be explained by elements of prospect theory. 
2 In the Weber and Camerer experiment, subjects whose shares were automat ically sold
every period (but could be bought back with no transaction cost) did not buy back the shares of
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One anomaly is called   the equity premium .  Stocks-- or equities-- tend to have more variable
annual price changes (or   returns ) than bonds do.  As a result, the average return to stocks
is higher, as a way of compensating investors for the additional risk they bear.  In most of this
century, for example, stock returns were about 8% per year higher than bond returns.  This was
accepted as a reasonable return premium for equities until Mehra and Prescott (1985) asked
how large a degree of risk-aversion is implied by this premium.  The answer is surprising-- 
under the standard assumptions of economic theory, investors must be extremely risk-averse to
demand such a high premium.  For example, a person with enough risk-aversion to explain the
equity premium would be indifferent between a coin flip paying either $50,000 or $100,000, and a
sure amount of $51,329.
Explaining why the equity premium is so high has preoccupied financial economists for the
last fifteen years (see Siegel and Thaler, 1997).   Benartzi and Thaler (1997) suggested a plausible
answer based on prospect theory. In their theory, investors are not averse to the variability of
returns, they are averse to loss (the chance that returns are negative).  Since annual stock returns
are negative much more frequently than annual bond returns are, loss-averse investors will
demand a large equity premium to compensate them for the much higher chance of losing money
in a year.  Keep in mind that the higher average return to stocks means that the cumulative return
to stocks over a longer horizon is increasingly likely to be positive as the horizon lengthens. 
Therefore, to explain the equity premium Benartzi and Thaler must assume that investors take a
short  horizon, over which stocks are more likely to lose money than bonds.   They compute the
expected prospect values of stock and bond returns over various horizons, using estimates of
investor utility functions from Kahneman and Tversky (1992), and including a loss-aversion
coefficient of 2.25 (i.e., the disutility of a small loss is 2.25 times as large as the utility of an equal
gain). Benartzi and Thaler show that over a one-year horizon, the prospect values of stock and
bond returns are about the same if stocks return 8% more than bonds, which explains the equity
premium. 
 
2. Finance: The disposition effect
Shefrin and Statman (1985) predicted that because people dislike incurring losses much
more than they like incurring gains, and are willing to gamble in the domain of losses, investors
will hold on to stocks that have lost value (relative to their purchase price) too long and will be
eager to sell stocks that have risen in value.  They called this the  disposition effect   .  The
disposition effect is anomalous because the purchase price of a stock should not matter much for
whether you decided to sell it.  If you think the stock will rise, you should keep it; if you think it
will fall, you should sell it. In addition, tax laws encourage people to sell losers rather than
winners, since such sales generate losses which can be used to reduce the taxes owed on capital
gains. 
Disposition effects have been found in experiments by (Weber and Camerer, 1998)2.  On
losers more than winners. This shows they are not optimistic about  the losers, but simply reluctant
to sell them and lock in a realized loss.
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large exchanges, trading volume of stocks that have fallen in price is lower than for stocks that
have risen.   The best field study was done by Odean (in press). He obtained data from a
brokerage firm about all the purchases and sales of a large sample of individual investors.  He
found that investors held losing stocks a median of 124 days, and held winners only 104 days.
Investors sometimes say they hold losers because they expect them to   bounce back   (or mean-
revert) but in Odean s sample, the unsold losers returned only 5% in the subsequent  year, while
the winners that were sold later returned 11.6%.  Interestingly, the winner-loser differences did
disappear in December.  In this month investors have their last chance to incur a tax advantage
from selling losers (and selling winners generates a taxable capital gain) so their reluctance to
incur losses is temporarily overwhelmed by  their last chance to save on taxes.
3. Labor supply
Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler (this volume) talked to cab drivers in New
York City about when they decide to quit driving each day.  Most of the drivers lease their cabs,
for a fixed fee, for up to 12 hours.  Many said they set an income target for the day, and quit
when they reach that target.  While daily income targeting seems sensible, it implies that drivers
will work long hours on bad days when the per-hour wage is low, and will quit earlier on good
high-wage days.  The standard theory of the supply of labor predicts the opposite: Drivers will
work the hours which are most  profitable, quitting early on bad day, and making up the shortfall
by working longer on good days. 
The daily targeting theory and the standard theory of labor supply therefore predict
opposite signs of the correlation between hours and the daily wage.  To measure the correlation,
we collected three samples of data on how many hours drivers worked on different days.  The
correlation between hours and wages was strongly negative for inexperienced drivers and close to
zero for experienced drivers.  This suggests that inexperienced drivers began using a daily income
targeting heuristic, but those who did so either tended to  quit, or learned by experience to shift
toward driving around the same number of hours every day.
Daily income targeting assumes loss-aversion in an indirect  way.  To explain why the
correlation between hours and wages for inexperienced drivers is so strongly negative, one needs
to assume that drivers take a one-day horizon, and have a utility funct ion for the day s income
which bends sharply at the daily income target.  This bend is an aversion to   losing   by falling
short of an income reference point.   
4. Asymmetric price elasticities of consumer goods
The price elasticity of a good is the change in quantity demanded, in percentage terms,
4divided by the percentage change in its price.  Hundreds of studies estimate elasticities by looking
at how much purchases change after prices change.  Loss-averse consumers dislike price increases
more than they like the windfall gain from price cuts, and will cut back purchases more when
prices rise, compared to the extra amount they buy when prices fall.  Loss-aversion therefore
implies elasticities will be asymmetric-- elasticities will be larger in magnitude after price increases
than after price decreases.  Putler (1992) looked for such an asymmetry in price elasticities in
consumer purchases of eggs, and found it.  
Hardie,  Johnson, and Fader (1993) replicated the study using a typical model of brand
choice in which a consumer  s utility for a brand is unobserved, but can be estimated by observing
purchases.  They included the possibility that consumers compare a good s current price to a
reference price (the last price they paid) and get more disutility from buying when prices have
risen than the extra utility they get when prices have fallen.  For orange juice, they estimate a
coefficient of loss-aversion around 2.4.
Note that for loss-aversion to explain these results, consumers must be narrowly
bracketing purchases of a specific good (eggs, or orange juice).  Otherwise, the loss from paying
more for one good would be integrated with gains or losses from other goods in their shopping
cart, and would not loom so large. 
5. Savings and consumption: Insensitivity to bad news
In economic models of lifetime savings and consumption decisions, people are assumed to
have separate utilities for consumption in each period, denoted u(c(t)), and discount factors which
weight future consumption less than current consumption.  These models are used to predict how
much rational consumers will consume (or spend) now and how much they will save, depending
on their current income, anticipations of future income, and their discount factors.  The models
make many predictions which seem to be false.  The central prediction is that people should plan
ahead by anticipating future income to make a guess about their  permanent  income  , and
consume a constant fraction of that total in any one year.  Since most  workers earn larger and
larger incomes throughout their lives, this prediction implies that people will spend more than they
earn when they are young-- borrowing if they can-- and will earn more than they spend when they
are older. But in fact, spending on consumption tends to be close to a fixed fraction of current
income, and does not vary across the life cycle nearly as much as standard theory predicts. 
Consumption also drops steeply after retirement, which it should not if people anticipate
retirement and save enough for it.
Shea (1995) pointed out another prediction of the standard life-cycle theory.  Think of a
group of workers whose wages for the next year are set in advance-- in Shea s empirical analysis,
these are unionized teachers whose contract is negotiated one year ahead.  In the standard theory,
if next year  s wage is surprisingly good, then the teachers should spend more now, and if next
year s wage is disappointingly low, the teachers should cut back on their spending now.  In fact,
the teachers in Shea s study did spend more when their future wages were expected to rise, but
they did not cut back when their future wages were cut. 
Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (BMR, 1997) can explain this pattern with a stylized two-
period consumption-savings model in which workers have reference-dependent utility, u(c(t)-r(t)).
The utility they get from consumption in each period exhibits loss-aversion (the marginal utility of
5consuming just enough to reach the reference point is always strictly larger than the marginal
utility from exceeding it) and a reflection effect (if people are consuming below their reference
point, the marginal ut ility of consumption rises as they get closer to it).  Workers begin with some
reference point r(t ), and save and consume in the first period. Their reference point in the second
period is an average of their initial reference point and their first-period consumption, so
r(2)=±r(1)+(1- ±)c(1). The pleasure workers get from consuming in the second period depends on
how much they consumed in the first period, through the effect of previous consumption on the
current reference point. If they consumed a lot at first, they will be disappointed if their standard
of living is cut.  
BMR show formally how this simple model can explain the behavior of the teachers in
Shea s study.  Suppose teachers are consuming at their reference point, and they get bad news
about future wages (in the sense that the distribution of possible wages next year shifts
downward).  BMR show that the teachers may not cut their current consumption at all. 
Consumption is   sticky downward  for two reasons: First, because they are loss-averse, cutting
current consumption means they will consume below their reference point this year, which feels
awful.  Second, because of reflection effects, they are willing to gamble that next year s wages
might not turn out  so bad-- they would rather take a gamble in which they either consume far
below their reference point or consume right at it, than accept consumption which is modestly
below the reference point. These two forces make the teachers reluctant to cut  their current
consumption after receiving bad news about future income prospects, explaining Shea s finding. 
6. Status quo bias, endowment effects, and buying-selling price
gaps
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) coined the term  status quo bias  to refer to an
exaggerated preference for the status quo, and showed such a bias in a series of experiments.
They also reported several observations in field data which are consistent with status quo bias.
When Harvard University added new health-care plan options, older faculty members who
were hired previously, when the new options were not available were, of course, allowed to
switch to the new options.  If one assumes that the new and old faculty members have essentially
the same preferences for health care plans, then the distribution of plans elected by new and old
faculty should be the same. However, Samuelson and Zeckhauser found that older faculty
members tended to stick to their previous plans; compared to the newer faculty members, fewer
of the old faculty elected new options. 
In cases where there is no status quo, people may have an exaggerated preference for
whichever option is the default choice. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993)
observed this phenomenon in decisions involving insurance purchases. At the time of their study,
Pennsylvania and New Jersey legislators were considering various kinds of tort reform, allowing
firms to offer cheaper automobile insurance which limited the rights of the insured person to sue
for damages from accidents. Both states adopted very similar forms of limited insurance, but they
chose different default options, creating a natural experiment.  All insurance companies mailed
forms to their customers, asking the customers whether they wanted the cheaper limited-rights
6insurance or the unlimited-rights insurance. One state made the limited-rights insurance the
default-- the insured person would get that if they did not respond-- and the other made
unlimited-rights the default.  In fact, the percentage of people electing the limited-rights insurance
was higher in the state where that was the default. An experiment replicated the effect.
A closely related body of research on endowment effects established that buying and
selling prices for a good are often quite different.  The paradigmatic experimental demonstration
of this is the  mugs  experiments of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990). In their experiments,
some subjects are endowed (randomly) with coffee mugs and others are not.  Those who are
given the mugs demand a price about 2-3 times as large as the price that those without mugs are
willing to pay, even though in economic theory these prices should be extremely close together. 
In fact, the mugs experiments were inspired by field observations of large gaps in hypothetical
buying and selling prices in  contingent valuations .  Contingent valuations are measurements of
the economic value of goods which are not normally traded-- like clean air, environmental
damage, and so forth.  These money valuations are used for doing benefit-cost analysis and
establishing economic damages in lawsuits.  There is a huge literature establishing that selling
prices are generally much larger than buying prices, although there is a heated debate among
psychologists and economists about what the price gap means, and how to measure  true 
valuations in the face of such a gap. 
All three phenomena-- status quo biases, default preference, and endowment effects-- are
consistent with aversion to losses relative to a reference point.  Making one option the status quo
or default, or endowing a person with a good (even hypothetically), seems to establish a reference
point people move away from only reluctantly, or if they are paid a large sum.
7. Racetrack betting: The favorite-longshot bias
In parimutuel betting on horse races, there is a pronounced bias toward betting on
 longshots , horses with a relatively small chance of winning. That is, if one groups longshots with
the same percentage of money bet on them into a class, the fraction of time horses in that class
win is far smaller than the percentage of money bet on them.  Horses with 2% of the total money
bet on them, for example, win only about 1% of the time (see Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Hausch
and Ziemba, 1995). 
The fact that longshots are overbet implies favorites are underbet.  Indeed, some horses
are so heavily favored that up to 70% of the win money is wagered on them.  For these heavy
favorites, the return for a dollar bet is very low if the horse wins. (Since the track keeps about
15% of the money bet for expenses and profit, bettors who bet on such a heavy favorite share
only 85% of the money with 70% of the people, a  payoff of only about $2.40 for a $2 bet.)
People dislike these bets so much that  in fact, if you make those bets you can earn a small positive
profit (even accounting for the track s 15% take). 
There are many explanations for the favorite-longshot bias, each of which probably
contributes to the phenomenon.  Horses that have lost many races in a row tend to be longshots,
so a gambler s fallacy belief that such horses are  due  for a win may contribute to overbetting on
them.  Prospect-theoretic overweighting of low probabilities of winning will also lead to
overbetting of longshots.  
7Within standard expected utility theory, the favorite-longshot bias can only be explained
by assuming that people have convex utility functions for money outcomes. The most careful
study comparing expected utility and prospect theory was done by Jullien and Salanié (1997).
Their study used a huge sample of  all the flat races run in England for ten years (34,443 races). 
They assume that bet tors value bets on horses using either expected utility theory, rank-dependent
utility theory, or cumulative prospect theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). If the marginal
bettor is indifferent among bets on all the horses at the odds established when the race is run, then
indifference conditions can be used to infer the parameters of that bettor s utility and probability
weighting functions. 
Jullien and Salanié find that cumulative prospect theory fits much better than rank-
dependent theory and expected utility theory.  They estimate that the utility function for small
money amounts is convex. Their est imate of the probability weighting function À (p) for
probabilities of gain is almost linear, but the weighting function for loss probabilities severely
overweights low probabilities of loss (e.g., À(.1)=.45 and À (.3)=.65).   These estimates imply a
surprising new explanation for the favorite-longshot bias: Bettors like longshots because they
have convex utility and weight  their high chances of losing and small chances of winning roughly
linearly.  But they hate favorites because they like to gamble (u(x) is convex), but are
disproportionately afraid of the small chance of  losing when they bet on a heavy favorite.  (In my
personal experience as a betting   researcher  I  ve found that losing on a heavy favorite is
particularly disappointing, an emotional effect the Jullien-Salanié estimates seem to capture.)
8. Racetrack betting: The end-of-the-day effect
McGlothlin (1956) and Ali (1977) established another racetrack anomaly which points to
the central role of reference points.  They found that bettors tend to shift their bets toward
longshots, and away from favorites, later in the racing day.  Because the track takes a hefty bite
out of each dollar, most bettors are behind by the last race of the day.  These bettors really prefer
longshots because a small longshot bet can generate a large enough profit to cover their earlier
losses, enabling them to break even.  The movement toward longshots, and away from favorites,
is so pronounced that some studies show that betting on the favorite to show (to finish first,
second, or third) in the last race is a profitable bet, even despite the track s take.
The end-of-the-day effect  is consistent with using zero daily profit as a reference point and
gambling in the domain of losses to break even. Expected utility theory cannot gracefully explain
the shift in risk preferences across the day if bettors integrate their wealth because the last race on
Saturday is not  fundamentally different than the first race on the bet tor s next outing.  Cumulative
prospect theory can explain the shift by assuming people open a mental account at  the beginning
of the day, close it at the end, and hate closing an account in the red.
9. State lotteries
 Lotto   is a special kind of lottery game in which players choose six different numbers
from a set of 40-50 numbers. They win a large jackpot if their six choice match six numbers which
are randomly drawn in public.  If no player picks all six numbers correctly, the jackpot is  rolled
3 A similar bet, the  pick six  , was introduced at horse racing tracks in the 1980s.  In the
pick six, bettors must choose the winners of six races. This is extremely hard to do so a large
rollover occurs if nobody has picked all six winners several days in a row, just like Lotto.  Pick six
betting now accounts for a large fraction of overall betting.
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over   and added to the next week s jackpot; several weeks of rollovers can build up jackpots up
to $50 million or more. The large jackpots have made Lotto very popular.3 Lotto was introduced
in several American states in 1980, and accounted for about  half of all state lottery ticket sales by
1989. 
Cook and Clotfelter (1993) suggest that the popularity of Lotto is due to the fact that
players are more sensitive to the large jackpot than to the correspondingly low probability of
winning.  They write (p. 634):
If players tend to judge the likelihood of winning based on the frequency with which 
someone wins, then a larger state can offer a game at longer odds but with the same 
perceived probability of winning as a smaller state. The larger population base in effect 
conceals the smaller probability of winning the jackpot, while the larger jackpot is highly 
visible. This interpretation is congruent with prospect theory.
Their regressions show that across states, ticket sales are strongly correlated with the size
of a state s population (which is correlated with jackpot size). Within a state, ticket sales each
week are strongly correlated with the size of the rollover. In expected utility, this can only be
explained by utility functions for money which are convex. Prospect theory easily explains the
demand for high jackpots, as Cook and Clotfelter suggest, by overweighting of, and insensitivity
toward, very low probabilities. 
10.  Telephone wire repair insurance
Ciccheti and Dubin (1994) conducted an interesting study of whether people purchase
insurance against damage to their telephone wiring.  The phone companies they studied either
require customers to pay for the cost of wiring repair, about $60, or buy insurance for $.45 per
month.  Given phone company estimates of the frequency of wire damage, the expected cost of
wire damage is only $.26.
Ciccheti and Dubin looked across geographical areas with different probabilities of wire
damage rates, to see whether variation in the tendency to buy insurance was related to different
probabilities.  They did find a relation, and exploited this to estimate parameters of an expected
utility model.  They found some evidence that people were weighting damage probabilities
nonlinearly, and also some evidence of status quo bias. (People who had previously been
uninsured, when a new insurance option was introduced, were less likely to buy it than new
customers were.)  
More importantly, Ciccheti and Dubin never asked whether it is reasonable to purchase
insurance against such a tiny risk.  In standard expected utility, a person who is averse to very
9modest risks at all levels of wealth should be more risk-averse to large risks. Rabin (1998b) was
the first to demonstrate how dramatic the implications of local risk-aversion are for global risk-
aversion.  He showed formally that a mildly risk-averse expected-utility maximizer who would
turn down a coin flip (at all wealth levels) in which she is equally likely to win $101 or lose $100
should not accept a coin flip in which she could lose $10,000, regardless of how much she could
win.  In expected utility terms, turning down the small-stakes flip implies a lit tle bit of curvature in
a $201 range of a concave utility function. Turning it down for all wealth levels implies the utility
function is slightly curved at all wealth levels, which implies a dramatic degree of global
curvature.
Rabin s proof implies a rejection of the joint hypotheses that consumers why buy wire-
repair insurance are integrating their wealth and valuing the insurance according to expected
utility (and know the correct probabilities of damage).  A more plausible explanation come
immediately from prospect theory-- consumers are overweighting the probability of damage. 
(Loss-aversion and reflection cannot explain their purchases because if they are loss-averse they
should dislike spending the $.45 per month, and reflection implies they will never insure unless
they overestimate the probability of loss.)   Once again, narrow bracketing is also required--
consumers must be focusing only on wire-repair risk,  since otherwise the tiny probability of a
modest loss would be absorbed into a portfolio of life s ups and downs and weighted more
reasonably.
Conclusion
Economists value (i) mathematical formalism and econometric parsimony, and (ii) the
ability of theory to explain naturally-occurring data. (I share these tastes.) This paper showed that
prospect theory is valuable in both ways because it can explain 10 patterns observed in a wide
variety of economic domains with a small number of modelling features. Different features of
prospect theory help explain different patterns. Loss-aversion can explain the extra return on
stocks compared to bonds (the equity premium), the tendency of cab drivers to work longer hours
on low-wage days, asymmetries in consumer react ions to price increases and decreases, the
insensitivity of consumption to bad new about income, and status quo and endowment effects. 
Reflection effects-- gambling in the domain of a perceived loss-- can explain holding losing stocks
longer than winners (disposition effects), insensitivity of consumption to bad income news, and
the shift toward longshot betting at the end of a racetrack day. Nonlinear weighting of
probabilities can explain the favorite-longshot bias in horse race betting, the popularity of Lotto
lotteries with large jackpots, and the purchase of telephone wire repair insurance. In addition, the
disposition effect and downward-sloping labor supply of cab drivers were not simply observed,
but were also predicted in advance, based on prospect theory. 
In virtually all these examples it is also necessary to assume people are isolating or
 narrowly bracketing  the relevant decisions.  Bracketing narrowly focuses attention most
dramatically on the possibility of a loss or extreme outcome, or a low probability. With broader
bracketing, outcomes are mingled with other gains and losses, diluting the psychological influence
of any single outcome and making these phenomena hard to explain as a result of prospect theory
valuation.
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I have two final comments.  First, I have chosen examples in which there are several
studies, or at least  one very conclusive one, showing regularities in field data which cannot be
easily reconciled with expected utility theory.  These regularities can sometimes be explained by
adding extra assumptions.  The problem is that these extras are truly ad hoc because each
regularity requires a special extra assumption.  Worse, an extra assumption which helps explain
one regularity may contradict another.  For example, assuming people are risk-preferring (i.e.,
have convex utility for money) can explain the popularity of longshot horses and Lotto, but that
assumption predicts stocks should return less than bonds, which is wildly false.   You can explain
why cab drivers drive long hours on bad days by assuming they cannot borrow (they are
 liquidity-constrained ), but liquidity-constraint implies teachers who get good income news
should not be able to spend more, while those who get bad news can cut back, which is exact ly
the opposite of what they do. 
Second, prospect theory is a suitable replacement for expected utility because it can
anomalies like those listed above, and can also explain the most basic phenomena expected utility
is used to explain. A prominent example is pricing of financial assets, discussed above in sections
1-2. Another prominent example, which appears in every economics textbook, is the voluntary
purchase of insurance by people. The expected utility explanation for why people buy actuarially
unfair insurance is that they have concave utility, so they hate losing large amounts of money
disproportionally, compared to spending small amounts on insurance premia. 
In fact, many people do not purchase insurance voluntarily (e.g., most states require
automobile insurance by law).  The failure to purchase is inconsistent with the expected utility
explanation, and more easy to reconcile with prospect theory (because the disutility of loss is
assumed to be convex). When people do buy insurance, people are probably avoiding low-
probability disasters which they overweight (the prospect theory explanation), rather than
avoiding a steep drop in a concave utility function (the expected utility theory explanation). 
A crucial kind of evidence which distinguishes the two explanations comes from
experiments on  probabilistic insurance -- insurance which does not pay a claim, if an accident
occurs, with some probability r.  According to expected utility theory, if r  is small people should
pay approximately (1-r) times as much for probabilistic insurance as they pay for full insurance
(Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky, 1997).  But experimental responses show that people hate
probabilistic insurance; they pay a multiple much less than 1-r for it (for example, they pay 80% as
much when r=.01).  Prospect theory can explain their hatred easily-- probabilistic insurance does
not reduce the probability of loss all the way toward zero, and the low probability r is still
overweighted.  Prospect theory can therefore explain why people buy full insurance, and why they
do not buy probabilistic insurance. Expected utility cannot do both. 
Since prospect theory can explain some of the basic phenomena expected utility was most
fruitfully applied to, like asset pricing and insurance purchase, and can also explain field anomalies
like the 10 listed in Table 1 (two of which were predicted), there is no good scientific reason why
it should not replace expected utility in current research, and be given prominent space in
economics textbooks. 
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Table 1: Ten field phenomena inconsistent with EU and consistent with cumulative prospect theory
DOMAIN PHENOMENON DESCRIPTION TYPE OF 
DATA
ISOLATED
DECISION
INGRED-
IENTS
REFRERENCES
Stock 
market
Equity premium Stock returns are too
high, relative to bond
returns
NYSE stock,
bond returns
Single yearly
return (not
long-run)
Loss-
aversion
Benartzi and
Thaler (1995)
Stock 
market
Disposition effect Hold losing stock too
long, sell  winners too
early
Individual
investor
trades
Single stock
(not portfolio)
Reflection
effect
Odean (in press)
Labor
economics
Downward-
sloping labor
supply
NYC cabdrivers quit
around daily income
target
Cabdriver
hours,
earnings
Single day
(not week or
month)
Loss-
aversion
Camerer et al
(1997)
Consumer
goods
Asymmetric price
elasticities
Purchases more
sensitive to pr ice
increases than to cuts
Product
purchases
(scanner data)
Single
product (not
shopping cart)
Loss-
aversion
Hardie, Johnson,
Fader (1993)
Macro-
economics
Insensitivity to 
bad income news
Consumers do not cut
consumption after bad
income news
Teachers 
earning,
savings
Single year Loss-
aversion,
reflect ion
effect
Shea (1994);
Bowman,
Minehart and
Rabin (1996)
Consumer
choice
Status quo bias,
Default bias
Consumers do not
switch health plans,
choose default
insurance
Health plan,
insurance
choices
Single choice Loss-
aversion
Samuelson and
Zeckhauser
(1988), Johnson
et al (1992)
Horserace
betting
Favorite-longshot
bias
Favorites are underbet,
longshots overbet
Track odds Single race
(not day)
Overweight
low p(loss)
Jullien and
Salanié (1997)
Horserace
betting
End-of-the-day
effect
Shift to longshots at
the end of the day
Track odds Single day Reflection
effect
McGlothlin
(1956)
Insurance Buying phone
wire insurance
Consumers buy
overpriced insurance
Phone wire
insurance
purchases
Single wire
risk (not
portfol io)
Overweight
low p(loss)
Cicchetti and
Dubin (1994)
Lottery 
betting
Demand for
Lotto
More tickets sold as
top prize r ises
Sta te lottery 
sales
Single lottery Overweight
low p(win)
Cook and
Clotfelter (1993)
